

# Around finite semantics for second-order multiplicative-additive linear logic

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NGUYỄN Lê Thành Dũng (a.k.a. Tito) — n1td@nguyentito.eu  
Laboratoire d'informatique de Paris Nord (LIPN), Université Paris 13  
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Based on joint work with:

- THOMAS SEILLER (CNRS, LIPN), my PhD advisor
- PAOLO PISTONE (Univ. Tübingen)
- LORENZO TORTORA DE FALCO (Univ. Roma Tre)

### **Theorem**

*Second order Multiplicative-Additive Linear Logic (MALL2) admits a finite denotational semantics.*

This talk: motivation and applications (intro);  
multiple constructions of finite models of MALL2.

Some of this is very recent work in progress.

Correctness not guaranteed.

## Why finite semantics?

The simply-typed  $\lambda$ -calculus admits finite denotational models, e.g. FinSet. Applications:

- *semantic evaluation* technique, often useful for studying complexity in  $ST\lambda$
- finite semantics for  $\lambda Y$  (i.e.  $ST\lambda + \text{fixpoints}$ ) lead to semantic approach to *higher-order model checking* (Aehlig, Salvati–Walukiewicz...)

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Propositional linear logic admits finite models, e.g. coherence spaces, Scott model. Yields refinements of the above, e.g.:

- Terui, RTA'12: semantic evaluation in the Scott model  
Slogan: “better semantics, faster computation”
- Grellois–Melliès: HOMC with LL semantics

## Why finite semantics? An example

Church encoding of bitstrings:

$$\text{Str}[A] = (A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow A).$$

### **Theorem (Hillebrand & Kanellakis, LICS'96)**

*The languages decided by ST $\lambda$ -terms of type  $\text{Str}[A] \rightarrow \text{Bool}$  are exactly the regular languages.*

Proof idea: build a DFA whose states are  $\llbracket \text{Str}[A] \rrbracket$ .

- an example of the semantic evaluation technique
- also, a correspondence Church encodings / finite automata; HOMC generalizes this to infinite trees

## Finite semantics for polymorphism

Previous examples work for *monomorphic* type systems.

This seems impossible with impredicative polymorphism.

For instance in System F:

### **Proposition**

*Any non-trivial semantics must be injective on  $\forall X. \text{Str}[X]$ .*

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### Proposition

*Any non-trivial semantics must be injective on  $\forall X. \text{Str}[X]$ .*

This example relies fundamentally on *non-linearity*.

Actually, there are finite models:

- with impredicative quantification;
- with exponentials;
- but not with both!

## Theorem

MALL2 *has a non-trivial finite semantics.*

Consequences on the expressive power of *recursive types*:

- $\mu$ MALL cannot be embedded in MALL2, since infinite datatypes, e.g. initial algebras, cannot be encoded
- characterization of regular languages in second-order Elementary Linear Logic
  - this is Baillot's characterization of P in ELL, minus type fixpoints

## Towards a syntactic model

Remark: in propositional MALL (MALL0), each formula has finitely many cut-free proofs.

→ Hope for a *syntactic model* of MALL2, injective on MALL0.

Difficulty of 2nd order case: arbitrarily large  $\exists$  witnesses.

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Difficulty of 2nd order case: arbitrarily large  $\exists$  witnesses.

Solution: *observational quotient* of the syntax.

- Choose observations which “cannot inspect witnesses”
- Intuition from programming languages:  $\exists$  = abstract types, dual to  $\forall$  = generic programs

# Equivalence for propositional observations

## Definition

Let  $A$  be a MALL2 formula and  $\pi, \pi' : A$ . Define  $\pi \sim_A \pi'$  as: for any *propositional* MALL formula  $B$ , for any proof  $\rho$  of  $A \vdash B$ ,  $\mathbf{cut}(\pi, \rho)$  and  $\mathbf{cut}(\pi', \rho)$  have the same normal form.

- $\sim$  is a congruence: the quotient is a model of MALL2
- $A$  existential-free  $\Rightarrow \sim_A$  trivial
- Example: the proofs of  $\exists X. X$  cannot be distinguished
  - Impredicative encodings of units work, e.g.  $\top \equiv \exists X. X$ .

## Theorem

For any MALL2 formula  $A$ , there are finitely many classes for  $\sim_A$ .

Proved with *proof nets* for MLL2, extended to MALL2 by a trick.

## The observational quotient is non-effective

The observational quotient seems very concrete and simple.

However, given a type  $A$ , one cannot enumerate  $A / \sim_A$ , even though it is finite. Indeed, one cannot check its emptiness:

### **Theorem (Lafont 1996)**

*MALL2 is undecidable.*

More: adapting Lafont's proof gives (caveat: to be checked)

### **Proposition**

*Given a MALL2 type  $A$  and  $\pi, \pi' : A$ ,  $\pi \sim_A \pi'$  is undecidable.*

(However, for a *fixed*  $A$ ,  $\sim_A$  is decidable.)

→ Search for *effective* finite models.

To overcome undecidability, enlarge the semantics.

# Non-syntactic finite models of MALL2

We will look at two different proposals.

1. *Coherence spaces*, using Girard's interpretation of polymorphism with *stable functors*
  - Usual argument for superiority of coherence spaces over Scott domains: *small* and legible interpretations of types
  - Here they will even be finite!
2. A sort of Geometry of Interaction construction inspired by the finiteness proof of the observational quotient

## Non-syntactic finite models of MALL2

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All of this is very recent.

I started looking at coherence spaces last week and stumbled against technical problems. (Only  $\simeq$  12 hours ago did I finally convince myself composition works!)

## Coherence spaces: variable types

We consider the category  $\text{CohI}$ :

- objects: coherence spaces (graphs  $X$  over vertex set  $|X|$ )
- morphisms  $X \hookrightarrow Y$ : *embeddings*, i.e. a graph isomorphism between  $X$  and an induced subgraph of  $Y$

An open type is represented as a functor  $F : \text{CohI}^n \rightarrow \text{CohI}$ .

For instance  $(- \multimap -)$  is indeed *covariant*:

if  $X \subseteq X', Y \subseteq Y'$ , then  $X \multimap Y \subseteq X' \multimap Y'$ .

We require  $F$  to be *stable*: preserving filtered colimits and pullbacks (think directed unions and finite intersections).

## Coherence spaces: variable cliques

If  $F$  is a stable functor, what are “terms of type  $F$ ”?

A *variable clique* is a family  $c_X \in \text{Cliques}(F(X))$ , such that for all embeddings  $f: X \hookrightarrow Y$ ,  $c_X = f^{-1}(c_Y)$ .

For an inclusion  $X \subseteq Y$ , this can be written  $c_X = c_Y \cap |F(X)|$ .

One may build the category interpreting types with 1 variable:

- objects: stable functors  $F: \text{CohI} \rightarrow \text{CohI}$
- morphisms: variable cliques of  $F \multimap G$

## Coherence spaces: the composition problem

Variable cliques  $c_X \in \text{Cliques}(F(X) \multimap G(X))$  correspond to linear functions  $f_X : F(X) \multimap G(X)$  making this diagram commute for all  $\iota : X \hookrightarrow Y$ :

$$\begin{array}{ccc} F(Y) & \xrightarrow{f_Y} & G(Y) \\ F(\iota)^+ \uparrow & & \downarrow G(\iota)^- \\ F(X) & \xrightarrow{f_X} & G(X) \end{array}$$

(In other words  $f_X(d) = f_Y(d) \cap |G(X)|$  for  $d \subseteq X \subseteq Y$ .)

Unlike naturality diagrams – which do *not* hold in general for variable cliques – a priori it is unclear that these can be pasted horizontally...

So composition, although it works (?), is a subtle consequence of *stability* (so it also works for the model of System F).

## Stable functors of finite degree (1)

If  $x \in |F(X_1, \dots, X_n)|$ , then there are *finite*  $X_1^0 \subseteq X_1, \dots, X_n^0 \subseteq X_n$  such that  $x \in |F(X_1^0, \dots, X_n^0)|$ .

This is because  $F$  is stable (Girard's *normal form theorem*).

But the  $X_i$  may be *unbounded*, e.g.  $F(X) = !X$ .

We restrict to functors of *finite degree*: if  $x \in |F(X_1, \dots, X_n)|$ , there are  $X_1^0, \dots, X_n^0$  of cardinality  $\leq d$  such that ...

Call  $\text{deg}(F)$  the smallest such  $d$ .

We say  $F$  is *finite* if it maps finite spaces to finite spaces and is of finite degree.

## Stable functors of finite degree (2)

By restricting to finite functors, we have excluded ?/! but we still interpret MALL2.

$$\deg(F^\perp) = \deg(F) \quad \deg(\forall Y. F(X_1, \dots, X_n, Y)) \leq \deg(F)$$

$$\deg(F \otimes G) \leq \deg(F) + \deg(G) \quad \deg(F \oplus G) \leq \max(\deg(F), \deg(G))$$

And if  $F$  is finite, then  $\forall Y. F(\dots, Y)$  also is (the  $X_i^0$ 's are closely related to the interpretation of  $\forall$ , this is where degree and cardinality interact).

### **Theorem**

*Coherence spaces provide a finite semantics for MALL2.*

Effectivity: I haven't had the time to check yet...

## A Geometry of Interaction-like model


Before presenting the next model, to motivate the intuitions, I need to come back to the proof of:

### **Theorem**


*For any MALL2 formula  $A$ , there are finitely many classes for  $\sim_A$ .*

From now on, familiarity with proof nets and GoI is assumed.

# What a propositional MLL proof net looks like




# What a **MLL2** proof net looks like




# Finiteness theorem (1): proof/observation interaction

$A$ : MLL2 formula;  $B$ : propositional MLL formula




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
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
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
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
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
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


## Finiteness theorem (3): big-step reduction




## Finiteness theorem (4): normalization

New redexes may appear during reduction.




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
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
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### Lemma (Progress)

*As long as there remains a cut-link, there is a redex for  $\Rightarrow$ .*

This is the tricky part of the proof.

## MLL2 normalization as a dialogue

One can see this big-step reduction as a *dialogue* between proof and observation, through the interface of the cut formula.

Bound on the number of rounds of the dialogue

$\rightsquigarrow$  bound on number of classes in observational quotient.

We would like to represent proofs as “strategies” for this dialogue, in such a way that strategies compose.

## MLL2 normalization as a fixed point

To a proof, we may associate a function sending a (partial) pairing of  $\exists$  variables to a pairing of  $\forall$  variables.

The “dialogue” then computes a *minimum common fixed point*.

—→ as in the GoI’s *feedback equation*.

A general setting for normalization as feedback: the  $\text{Int}$  construction on traced monoidal categories.

$\text{Int}(\mathcal{C})$  is automatically compact closed: we get propositional MLL for free.

## The GoI-like model (1)

We now work in the category  $\text{Int}(\text{CohS})$ :

- objects: pairs  $(A, E)$  of coherence spaces
- morphisms  $(A, E) \rightarrow (A', E')$ : stable fn  $A \& E' \rightarrow E \& A'$
- composition  $(A, E) \rightarrow (A', E') \rightarrow (A'', E'')$ : take

$$A \& E' \rightarrow E \& A' \quad A' \& E'' \rightarrow E' \& A''$$

feed right  $E'$  to left  $E'$ , left  $A'$  to right  $A'$ ,  
and compute minimum fixpoint.

- monoidal product:  $(A, E) * (A', E') = (A \& A', E \& E')$
- duality:  $(A, E)^\perp = (E, A)$

Intuition: ask  $E$ , answer  $A$ . Will be used with  
 $E = \{\exists \text{ variable pairings}\}, A = \{\forall \text{ pairings}\}.$

## The GoI-like model (2)

A variable type should be a functor

$$F : \text{Int}(\text{CohS})^n \times (\text{Int}(\text{CohS})^{\text{op}})^n \rightarrow \text{Int}(\text{CohS}).$$

And an element of type  $F$  should be a “sufficiently uniform” family of morphisms  $1 \rightarrow F(X, X)$ .

In the case  $F(X, X) = K * X^m * (X^\perp)^n$ , and  $X = (A, E)$ , that is a stable function  $E_K \& E^m \& A^n \rightarrow A_K \& A^m \& E^n$ , which should just redirect:

- the  $A$  on the left (from  $X^\perp$ ) to those on the right (from  $X$ )
- the  $E$  on the left (from  $X$ ) to those on the right (from  $X^\perp$ )

corresponding respectively to arcs  $X^\perp \longrightarrow X$  and  $X \longrightarrow X^\perp$ .

So it would be a function from  $E_K$  to such a set of directed arcs, generalizing sets of axiom links. ( $\simeq$  Seiller’s interaction graphs)

## The GoI-like model (3)

Write  $L(m, n)$  for the set of directed arcs either from  $\{1, \dots, m\}$  to  $\{1, \dots, n\}$  or from  $\{1, \dots, n\}$  to  $\{1, \dots, m\}$ .

With the right coherence relation, the cliques of  $L(m, n)$  are codeterministic bipartite directed graphs.

Informal conjecture:

$$\forall X. K * X^m * (X^\perp)^n = K * (L(m, n), 1)$$

$$\exists X. K * X^m * (X^\perp)^n = K * (1, L(m, n))$$

$\forall$  adds a part to the answers.

$\exists$  adds a part to the questions.

Note:  $\forall X$  and  $\exists X$  commute with  $(K * -)$  if  $K$  contains no  $X$ .

As expected, since  $* = \otimes = \wp$ .

## The GoI-like model (3)

How to reflect composition of “sufficiently uniform” families

$$K * X^m * (X^\perp)^n \rightarrow K' * X^{m'} * (X^\perp)^{n'} \rightarrow K'' * X^{m''} * (X^\perp)^{n''}$$

as an operation on the  $\forall$ ? Take

$$A \& E' \rightarrow E \& A' \& L(n+m', m+n') \quad A' \& E'' \rightarrow E' \& A'' \& L(n'+m'', m'+n'')$$

Feedback matching input/output, we get:

$$A \& E'' \rightarrow E \& A'' \& L(n+m', m+n') \& L(n'+m'', m'+n'')$$

Need morphism

$$L(n+m', m+n') \& L(n'+m'', m'+n'') \rightarrow L(n+m'', m+n'')$$

should correspond to execution by alternating paths (à la GoI)!

First resolve dialogue of  $\exists/\forall$ , then propositional normalization.

→ particle-style GoI = wave-style GoI + uniformity

## Inversion of polarities

Types of the form  $(A, \top)$  are morally *positive*, they can be duplicated/erased (because  $\&$  = cartesian product of CohS).

Positivation:  $!(A, E) = (E \rightarrow A, \top)$ .

Seems to interpret propositional MELL.

$\forall$  seems to be positive, since it acts on the left of the pair!

In particular  $\forall X. F$ , where the only variable of  $F$  is  $X$ , is interpreted as positive.

As opposed to usual polarities:  $\forall$  invertible, therefore negative.

Morally,  $\forall$  “plays” a set of arcs, it is analogous to a  $\oplus$ ;

whereas  $\exists$  “reacts”, analogously to  $\&$ .

(Extension to additives will probably need to handle polarity.)

$$A \otimes B \equiv \forall X. (A \multimap B \multimap X) \multimap X$$

$$A \oplus B \equiv \forall X. !(A \multimap X) \multimap !(B \multimap X) \multimap X$$

*“The second-order translations do invert polarities. [...] This inversion of polarities is due to deep reasons – so deep that they remain completely obscure.”*

— Girard, *The Blind Spot*, §12.B.2